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THE BILLABLE HOURS DERBY: EMPIRICAL 
DATA ON THE PROBLEMS AND PRESSURE 
POINTS 
by Susan Saab Fortney 
If you ask law firm attorneys to identify their biggest complaint related 
to private law practice, most will probably respond with one word: billing.1  
At the same time, clients are likely to identify billing as their most serious 
concern associated with obtaining legal services.2  The irony in clients and 
attorneys sharing frustration over hourly billing relates to the fact that the 
initial interest in hourly billing stemmed from attorneys’ desire to be 
efficient and to maximize their earnings and clients’ preference for only 
paying for the actual time expended on their behalf.3
 
 1. As explained by President of the American Bar Association, Robert E. Hirshon, in 
his Preface to the A.B.A Commission on Billable Hours Report, “It has become increasingly 
clear that many of the legal profession’s contemporary woes intersect at the billable hour.”  
A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 2001-2002, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/careercounsel/billable.toolkit/bhcomplete.pdf at ix [hereinafter 
A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT]. 
  Since the 1960s, 
hourly billing has evolved as the dominant billing method used by non-
 2. A recent American Bar Association Section of Litigation study on public 
perceptions of attorneys found attorneys fees to be at the heart of many consumers’ negative 
experiences with attorneys.  According to the study report: “Of all the criticism that 
consumers raise about their personal experiences with lawyers, the greatest number of 
complaints arise around lawyers’ fees.  Consumers say that lawyers charge too much for 
their services, are often not up front about their fees, and are unwilling to account for their 
charges or hours.”  Leo J. Shapiro & Associates, Public Perceptions of Lawyers–Consumer 
Research Findings, 2002 A.B.A SEC. LITIG. 14, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf. 
 3. In the 1960s, management consultants suggested that attorneys who used hourly 
billing to determine their fees made more than those who used other methods.  Stephen W. 
Jones & Melissa Bear Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing Practices, 20 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 293, 294 (1998).  At the same time, corporate managers and members 
of the business community reportedly welcomed hourly billing because it enabled clients to 
“correlate the ‘product’ that they are buying to the products they themselves produced and 
sold.”  William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 
11 n.64 (1991) (citing Mary Ann Altman, A Perspective–From Value Billing to Time Billing 
and Back to Value Billing, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF 
ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 11 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989)). 
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contingency fee attorneys.4  When hourly billing became widespread, the 
number of billable hours expected of firm attorneys dramatically increased 
as billable hours clocked and business generated assumed greater 
importance in evaluating attorney contributions and compensation.5  As 
explained by one commentator, “[h]ourly billing, which started as a tool for 
law office management, turned into a requirement for all timekeepers to 
bill a large minimum number of hours per year.  Salary, bonus and growth 
within the firm began to be largely based on the number of hours billed.”6
Over the last decade the number of hours expected of associates 
increased along with hikes in associate salaries.
 
7
Insiders and outsiders alike have speculated on the short and long-term 
effects of these increases in billable hours expectations.
  Pointing to the spiral of 
increases in associate salaries followed by increases in billable hours 
requirements, firm managers may engage in an exercise of blaming the 
“greedy associates.”  Another reaction involves blaming the “greedy 
partners” who seek to preserve or even increase partner revenues, while 
using higher salaries to recruit associates. 
8  To gauge the 
effects of these increases, I conducted a 1999-2000 empirical study of 
associate satisfaction, law firm culture, and billing practices.  This study 
used a mail questionnaire to survey 1000 associates practicing in Texas 
firms with more than ten attorneys.9
 
 4. See Robert E. Hirshon, Law and the Billable Hour, A Standard Developed in the 
1960s May Be Damaging Our Profession, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002, at 10 (noting that hourly 
billing became the norm in the 1960s with the elimination of bar fee-schedules and a cost-
conscious revolt against the one-line fee letters).  While clients “enjoy the detail [of hourly 
billing], firms enjoy the limited risk and the ease of valuing associates and partners.”  Id. 
  Five years later, in 2005, I conducted 
 5. For the history of hourly billing that traces the shift from “billable hours goals” to 
“billable hour commitments,” see A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT, supra 
note 1, at 3 (observing that “billable hour commitments reached unreasonably high levels in 
many firms” during the 1990s). 
 6. Gerald F. Phillips, The Rules of Professional Conduct Should Provide Guidance to 
Attorneys with Respect to Billing Clients, PROF. LAW., Spring, 2004, at 2. 
 7. For a discussion of the connection between increases in associate salaries and 
billable hour requirements, see Susan Saab Fortney, I Don’t Have Time To Be Ethical: 
Addressing the Effects of Billable Hour Pressure, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 305-06 (2003) 
(referring to one analysis that estimated that associates would be working an extra 300 hours 
a year to fund some salary increases.) 
 8. See, e.g., A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-11 
(reviewing the “unintended consequences” and “corrosive impact of emphasis on billable 
hours”) and WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF THE TIME-BASED 
BILLING BY ATTORNEY (1996) (analyzing the results of two surveys on billable hours 
practices). 
 9. For a discussion of the study methodology, results, and recommendations, see Susan 
Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm 
Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 243-99 
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another empirical study on attorney work-life issues and employer efforts 
to assist attorneys in dealing with work-life conflicts.  The 2005 study, 
funded by The NALP Foundation, was a cross-profession national study of 
supervised and managing attorneys in law firms, government offices, and 
in-house counsel departments.  Although the NALP Foundation study, 
called In Pursuit of Attorney Work-Life Balance: Best Practices in 
Management (“2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study”), focused on 
work-life issues, billable hours pressure emerged as a concern shared by 
numerous firm attorneys.10  In discussing the time famine and other work-
life conflicts encountered by practitioners, numerous study participants 
commented on the tyranny of the billable hour.11
In an effort to formulate possible solutions to problems identified by 
practitioners, this article uses information obtained in both studies to 
discuss firm culture, compensation systems, attorney perceptions, and 
conduct.  For background and context, Part I describes the 2005 NALP 
Foundation Work-Life Study rationale and methodology.  Part II 
summarizes select study findings related to billable hours requirements and 
pressure.  The text of this article discusses select findings from the 2005 
NALP Foundation Work-Life Study relating to billable hours requirements; 
the footnotes compare those findings to the results of the 1999-2000 
Associate Study.  Part III concludes by considering what forces and players 
will change the current course of conduct in which law firm leaders treat 
increases in billable hours expectations as a necessary evil. 
 
PART I: STUDY RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY 
In 2005, The NALP Foundation conducted a national study of attorneys’ 
work-life balance issues to help attorneys and their employers better 
understand and evaluate work-life conflicts and approaches for addressing 
conflicts.  Unlike other studies that focused on attorneys in one state or 
practice setting, the study sought information from a national sample of 
managing and supervised attorneys in different practice settings.  
The national study involved two phases, one designed to yield 
quantitative information and one designed to provide qualitative 
information.  In Phase One of the study, survey information was obtained 
using two questionnaires, one for managing attorneys (“Managing Attorney 
Work-Life Survey”) and one for supervised attorneys (“Attorney Work-
 
(2000) [hereinafter  1999-2000 Associate Survey]. 
 10. For the complete study report, see SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF ATTORNEY 
WORK-LIFE BALANCE: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT (Paula Patton ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY]. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
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Life Survey”).  In February 2005, these questionnaires were mailed to a 
random sample of attorneys in law firms, corporations, and government 
agencies.12
The study design called for 250 questionnaires to be sent to managing 
attorneys in each of the following groups: government offices, corporate 
legal departments, and law firms of varying sizes.
 
13  In addition, four 
supervised attorneys in each of these segments were randomly selected to 
receive the Attorney Work-Life Survey.  After sampling and dropping 
names for reasons such as address problems, the final sample consisted of 
1,138 managing attorneys and 4,649 supervised attorneys in all segments.14
The mailing of the Attorney Work-Life Survey and Managing Attorney 
Work-Life Survey yielded 679 responses for a response rate of 12.3 percent 
for supervised attorneys and 9.4 percent for managing attorneys.  The 
responses from managing and supervised attorneys were spread among 
each practice segment.
 
15
After survey responses were received, nine focus group sessions were 
conducted to provide a mix of perspectives from attorneys in different 
practice areas, positions, and regions.
 
16  In these focus groups, managing 
and supervised attorneys candidly and confidentially discussed work-life 
issues.17  The focus group discussions provided opportunities to explore 
specific issues identified in Phase One of the study.18
 
 12. For information on the number of respondents in each category see 2005 NALP 
FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, at app. A, 84-85. 
  Focus group 
participants also provided insights and anecdotal information related to 
their experiences and perspectives on work-life issues, employer programs, 
employer policies, and best practices related to attorneys balancing their 
 13. The law firm study population targeted attorneys in Large Firms, defined as firms 
with more than 150 attorneys in all offices, Mid-Sized Firms defined as firms with 50 to 150 
attorneys in all offices,  and Small Firms, defined to be firms with 10 to 49 attorneys in all 
offices.  Id. at 84. 
 14. See id. at 83-86 (providing additional information on the survey methodology). 
 15. Id. at 84-85 (providing detailed information on the response rates of each practice 
sector). 
 16. Id. at 85-86.  A focus group coordinator used a variety of means to invite attorneys 
to participate in focus groups in their area, including email invitations sent by law schools 
and bar associations, as well as individual invitations sent to a random sample of attorneys 
in the select cities).  Id. 
 17. Id. at 86.  Focus groups met in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, and 
Washington, D.C.  Firm associates and partners met in separate focus groups. Id. 
 18. Id. at 86.  An experienced focus group facilitator used a query script to guide the 
discussion.  The query script covered the following areas: (1) work-life conflicts and work 
demands; (2) organizational policies, practices and work-life strategies; (3) organizational 
culture and attitudes related to work-life issues; and (4) professional expectations and 
attorney retention.  Id. 
CHRISTENSEN_FORTNEY 2/3/2011  10:09 PM 
2005] BILLABLE HOURS DERBY 105 
work and personal lives.19
PART II: GENERAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS AND SURVEY 
FINDINGS RELATED TO BILLING AND BILLABLE HOURS 
EXPECTATIONS 
  
The survey generated responses from managing and employed attorneys 
working in government offices, in-house legal departments, and firms with 
ten or more attorneys in all branches or offices worldwide.  The discussion 
below focuses on information provided by law firm respondents. 
The majority of firm respondents (81.9 percent) were associates on the 
partnership track, 8 percent were law firm attorneys not on the partnership 
track, and 0.5 percent were contract attorneys.  Most of these respondents 
(93.2 percent) worked on a full-time basis and 6.8 percent worked on a 
part-time basis.20
Both survey instruments asked respondents to provide information 
related to hours billed and billable hours expectations, if any.  Survey data 
reflect the trend among law firms to adopt minimum billing expectations or 
requirements.
 
21
Table One below sets forth the mean calculations by firm size based on 
supervised attorney responses on billable hours requirements and hours 
actually billed. 
  When asked to indicate whether the respondent’s 
organization has a minimum billable hours expectation or requirement for 
associates, 82.8 percent of firm managing attorneys checked “yes” and 85.6 
percent of firm supervised attorneys checked “yes.”  The questionnaires 
then asked respondents to note the annual billing expectation or 
requirement.  The mean number of hours for the billable hours requirement 
or expectation was 1,861 hours per year based on managing attorney 
responses and 1,887 hours per year based on supervised attorney responses. 
 
 
 19. See 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 85-115 
(providing additional information on the focus groups). 
 20. Id. at 9.  Among all respondents from the three practice sectors, 5.9 percent 
indicated that they worked part-time.  Id. 
 21. See Molly George, Do You Get What you Pay For?  Measure Your Associates’ ROI, 
LEGAL MGMT., May-June 2003, at 58, 62 (noting that most firms require between 1,700 and 
2,300 billable hours from their associates).  Across the Atlantic, “collegial” British firms 
have joined the movement to set and increase billable hours targets.  Gail Diane Cox, A Hop 
Across the Pond Fills New York Firms’ Pockets, THE RECORDER, Sept. 11, 2003, at 2. 
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Table One22
Firm Size and Annual Minimum Billing Requirement and Hours Billed in 2004 as Reported 
by Supervised Firm Attorneys 
 
Firm Size                                     Mean Hours Required          Mean Hours Billed in 2004 
Small Firms (10-49 attorneys)                1867                                              1886 
Mid-size Firms (50-150 attorneys)         1895                                              1953 
Large Firms (151-300 attorneys)            1919                                              1971 
Very Large Firms (over 300 attorneys)  1930                                              2059 
 
The mean calculations in Table One reflect that the mean for hours 
required, as well as hours actually billed in 2004, increased with firm size.  
In firms of all sizes, the mean number for hours billed exceeds the 
minimum billable expectation, anywhere from nineteen hours for Small 
Firms to 129 hours for Very Large Firms.  Associates whose billable hours 
production exceeds the minimum requirement may expect favorable 
treatment when considered for bonuses and promotion.23
Survey responses also reflect the movement among firms to use billable 
hours production to determine bonuses.
 
24
 
 22. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 10. 
  In the survey, the majority of 
managers and supervising attorneys reported that associate bonuses are 
largely based on billable hours production.  While eighty-three percent of 
supervised attorneys indicated that bonuses were largely based on billable 
hours production, only 67.2 percent of firm managing attorneys answered 
 23. These associates may understand that, “most law firms tie associate performance 
assessments to billable hours . . . .” Billable Hours: An On-Going Threat to Associate 
Retention, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFF., Sept. 2002, at 11. 
 24. See AMLAW 100 Revenues Climb, But not Profits, N.Y.L. J., July 2, 2001, at 1 
(referring to the trend to link bonuses to billable hours).  Questioning the wisdom of hours-
driven incentives, one large Texas firm has recently moved from an “hours-driven bonus 
system” to a discretionary one.  Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Thompson & Knight Raises 
Associates’ Base Salaries, TEX. LAW. Aug. 9, 2004, at 1.  In explaining the shift in 
approach, the managing partner of Thompson & Knight explained, “We had an hours-driven 
bonus system, and we decided that was not the best system for associate development, or for 
client service . . . If it’s hours driven, people do what you measure.”  Id. 
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in the affirmative.  This difference in percentages could reflect the fact that 
different law firms may be represented by the respondents in the two 
surveys.  Another possibility is that a large percentage of associates may 
perceive billable hours production as “driving the bonus train,” although 
managing attorneys may not share that perception.  A third possibility is 
that some managing attorneys either genuinely believe that they base 
bonuses on a variety of factors or decline to acknowledge the significant 
role that hours play in bonus determinations.25
Other survey responses provide supervised attorneys’ perspectives on 
the firm incentives to clock hours.  The majority of firm supervised 
attorneys (fifty-two percent) agreed with the following statement, “My 
career advancement is principally based on the number of hours that I 
work.”
 
26 Only twenty-two percent disagreed with the statement.27
Overall, a commonly expressed complaint related to “quantifying” worth 
and contributions based on billable hours production.  One supervised firm 
attorney simply stated that “devotion equals promotion.  The more you 
work the higher you rise.”
 
28  Other respondents commented on other 
consequences of emphasizing billable hours production.29
 
 25. Rather than using an hours-driven bonus system, some firms rely primarily on salary 
adjustments to recognize total contributions made by attorneys.  For example, Schmeltzer, 
Aptaker & Shepard, P.C., a mid-size litigation boutique, evaluates partners and associates 
“holistically,” considering a number of factors, as opposed to setting compensation solely on 
hours.  A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 54-55. 
  One 
consequence that should concern firms as providers of legal services and 
clients is that rewarding high billable hours production “breeds overwork.”  
 26. Out of the fifty-two percent of respondents who indicated that they agree with this 
statement, nineteen percent indicated that they “strongly agree.”  In the 1999-2000 
Associate Study, thirty-two percent of respondents noted that they “strongly agree” with the 
statement, “My income and advancement within the firm are principally based on the 
number of hours that I bill and collect.”  Another 44 percent indicated that they “somewhat 
agree” with the statement.  1999-2000 Associate Study at 277. 
 27. Approximately 4 percent of the 22 percent of respondents indicated that they 
“strongly disagree” with the statement, “My career advancement is principally based on the 
hours that I work.”  2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 
97. 
 28. Id., at 19. 
 29. One respondent referred to this as an “obsession with the numbers.”  Unpublished 
data from the 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY (on file with author) 
[hereinafter UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA].  In criticizing reliance on “the 
numbers,” one commentary warns that “using the number of hours to bill clients and assess 
productivity reduced attorneys’ work to something on par with a quota system” condemned 
in other settings.  Robert Pack, The Tyranny of the Billable Hour, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2005, at 
20.  Personnel claims may be an unintended consequence of “quantifying” contributions.  
See 1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9, at 275-78 (discussing the risks of 
emphasizing quantity over quality). 
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As explained by a supervised firm attorney, an “efficient and productive 
associate” is “penalized,” while the associate who may “pad” hours “gets a 
significant raise/bonus.”30
The 2000 billable hour requirement is an impossible task for an HONEST 
hardworking attorney.  I am here every day at least 12 hours and NEVER 
take a lunch.  But not everything is billable.  I made my hours last year 
but did so only because I did not take a vacation.  I HATE being an 
attorney! I have no life.  I know that my colleagues regularly falsely 
elevate their time entries.  They have to because they all take lunches 
everyday and leave at 5 or 6 every night.
  Another survey respondent described the 
competitive disadvantage for ethical associates as follows: 
31
This quotation captures the dilemma for ethical attorneys.  If a firm 
largely bases compensation on hourly production, ethical associates who 
refuse to pad time may function at a competitive disadvantage when 
compared to associates who inflate their time.  Based on study findings 
from my 1999-2000 empirical study on billable hours expectations and 
firm culture, I opined that a serious deleterious effect of “quantifying” 
value may be the exodus of ethical associates who leave private law 
practice rather than rationalizing questionable billing practices.
 
32
Focus group participants provided additional insights on the connection 
between billing hours and firm culture, compensation, and attorney 
conduct.  Firm associates and partners alike discussed increased pressure to 
bill.  For example, in response to an inquiry on perceived changes in the 
legal profession, one New York partner noted that the demand for hours is 
“substantially higher.”
   
33
Partners participating in focus groups recognized the connection 
between increases in billing expectations and salary hikes.  One Chicago 
partner questioned the trend of “mandating advancement in salary levels 
 
 
 30. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. 
 31.  Id. 
 32. The 1999-2000 Associate Survey asked respondents to indicate whether they agreed 
with the following statement: “Billing pressure causes ethical and competent attorneys to 
leave private law practice.”  Forty-six percent agreed with the statement, while twenty-three 
percent disagreed.  The balance neither agreed nor disagreed. 1999-2000 Associate Survey, 
supra note 9, at 279 (concluding that findings related to the “exodus of ethical associates” 
may be “the most disturbing survey result because it suggests that billing pressure may be 
causing firms to lose ethical associates and future leaders who uphold high ethical 
standards”). 
 33. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.  Another partner 
participant in the New York focus group concurred, stating, “Hours that are required now 
are much greater than 10, 12 years ago, and I don’t see any let up in sight going forward, 
either for partners or associates.”  Id. 
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based upon mandated billable hours for the year.”34  The partner explained 
that this trend resulted first in a “real bump in associate-starting salaries” 
and then an increase in the “level of billable hours . . . not only for 
associates, but for partners.”35
Commenting on increases in salary and billable hours requirements, an 
associate participating in the New York focus group explained: 
 
The hours keep going up and it doesn’t seem like there is a limit or ceiling 
on how high a firm thinks it can put those billable hours. . . . As the hours 
keep going up [there] is less recognition that you have a life outside of 
work and more recognition that you are supposed to be here billing. . . . 36
Respondents frequently commented on employer emphasis on billable 
hours production and the pressure to clock long hours.  In struggling to 
meet billing expectations or targets, respondents explained the additional 
time commitment associated with completing non-billable tasks such as 
recruiting, training, speaking, writing, and marketing.  Some noted that this 
non-billable work does not receive credit or consideration for bonus 
purposes.
 
37
For many, billable hours pressure and long hours were at the heart of 
work-life conflicts.  From the standpoint of individual attorneys, the 
“obsession with the numbers” may make it difficult for people to be 
successful and have a balanced life.  According to one respondent, 
“Obviously, my major life struggle comes from billable hours.  I NEVER 
stay at work late because there’s work to be done.  I ONLY stay late, and 
deprive my family for a billable hour.”
 
38
A few managing attorneys commented on the personal toll taken when 
firms increase billable hour expectations.  One firm manager noted that it 
 
 
 34. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. 
 35. Id.  In speaking of the practice of “mandating advancement in salary levels based 
upon a mandated billable hours for the year,” the Chicago partner stated, “I think the 
profession would be better served and I think clients would be better served if that . . . 
became an unethical practice.”  Id. 
 36. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 67.  The associate 
reported a willingness to take “$25,000 less if you gave me back those fifty hours.”  
UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. 
 37. In recognition of the fact that attorneys must devote time to activities such as 
continuing legal education, business promotion, and administrative work, the old rule of 
thumb was that one-third of an attorney’s work time is non-billable. William G. Ross, 
Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2199, 2203 (1998) (explaining that 
experts agree that approximately one-third of office time is “typically consumed by non-
billable activities”).  Apparently, this message has not been conveyed to associates who 
maintain that non-billable time should “count” toward billable requirements.  UNPUBLISHED 
WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. 
 38. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 19. 
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was “ludicrous” that large firms that require over 2000 hours as a minimum 
“are also interested in quality of life issues.”39  The manager went on to 
say, “There is NOTHING more damaging to work-life issues than 
unrealistic billable hours.  You don’t need concierge services and other 
perks like that if your people have enough of a balance in their lives.”40
In response to the open-ended inquiry that asked supervised attorneys to 
describe improvements their employers could make to ameliorate work-life 
conflicts, some respondents recommended eliminating billable 
minimums.
 
41  Many more urged lowering the billable hours requirement or 
target.42  One respondent criticized a 2,000 per year minimum, stating: “It 
is ridiculous that [2000 hours] is considered a ‘minimum.’  With a 
minimum that high I have no need to know what a maximum or above 
average expectation looks like.”43
Beyond the work-life conflicts created by increased billable hours 
pressure, focus group participants, like survey respondents, expressed 
concern about inefficiency and unnecessary work performed when 
compensation structures create incentives to bill.
 
44
There has to be a temptation—and then it gets realized—of billing hours 
that are, indeed, not necessary or not efficient because of the target of 
maintaining those billable hours is more important and is a bigger 
incentive than billing those hours, spending that time because you want to 
  Speaking of high 
billable hours expectations, one Chicago partner cautioned: 
 
 39. Id. at 29. 
 40. Id. 
 41. As stated by one supervised attorney who completed the Attorney Work-Life 
Survey: 
Get rid of the billable minimum!  It makes law firm work too stressful; it 
encourages bill padding, it discourages training.  Law firm culture already insures 
we won’t say “no” to assignments, so we don’t need the 1950 threat looming over 
us to make us work and because our compensation is tied to meeting the 1950 
threshold, its unfair to penalize associates who don’t meet that requirement in 
years when there wasn’t enough work available.  It’s a bad system. 
UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. 
 42. Id.  For example, one respondent recommended reducing “minimum billable hours 
to a realistic goal, say 1,700-1,800.”  Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The focus group respondents shared concerns similar to those expressed by various 
commentators who question rewarding hours production.  See 1999-2000 Associate Survey, 
supra note 9, at 275-78.  As suggested by Professor David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati, 
using hours to measure associates’ work creates an incentive for associates to inflate their 
hours.  David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: 
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law 
Firms, 8 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998). 
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make sure that the clients’ interests were served.45
Later in the focus group, the same Chicago partner explained that the 
partner’s firm addressed the risk of inefficiency and overworking client 
matters by requiring billing attorneys to “scrutinize very heavily the 
hours.”
 
46  Such scrutiny may help allay client concerns about the impact of 
firm practices of increasing billing requirements and calculating bonuses 
based on hours billed.47  In addition, clients or their representatives may 
audit bills, looking for inefficiency and padding.48
While supervising attorneys, clients, and their representatives may be 
able to detect unnecessary billing entries, compromised performance may 
be more difficult to detect.  To obtain information related to work demands 
and cognitive performance, the Attorney Work-Life Survey included two 
inquiries related to cognitive performance.  The first question asked 
respondents to indicate the average amount of sleep they obtain.  Among 
law firm respondents, three percent reported that they average less than five 
hours of sleep per night before a work day and 35.7 percent reported that 
they average five to six hours of sleep per night.
 
49  These attorneys may not 
be obtaining adequate sleep for peak performance because sleep research 
has revealed that individuals consistently sleeping six or fewer hours per 
night may be accumulating a “sleep debt” that “cuts into their cognitive 
abilities.”50
 
 45. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 20. 
 
 46. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.  As explained in a 
commentary on billing practices, “partners should review bills with new associates each 
month, so they can see how the law firm billed for their work.”  Stephanie Francis Ward, 
Billing Basics, Associates Need to Learn Nuances of Billing Before Starting Big Projects, 90 
A.B.A. J. 42, 42, Oct. 2004 (quoting a fifth-year associate who suggests that such review 
does not occur because “everyone is so busy”). 
 47. Unfortunately, anecdotal and study reports suggest that large percentages of 
supervising attorneys may not be closely monitoring billing entries.  In the 1999-2000 
Associate Survey, sixty-one percent of firm associates reported that their supervising 
attorneys never questioned their billing entries during the past year.  1999-2000 Associate 
Survey, supra note 9, at 256.  Over seventy percent of associates in firms with over 100 
attorneys indicated that their billings had never been questioned in the past year.  Id.  
Supervising attorneys may be less inclined to devote time to scrutinizing billings, training, 
and mentoring if the partner compensation turns on objective measures, such as hours billed 
and business generated.  See id. at 281-83 (discussing commentary and study findings 
related to the affect of partner compensation systems on partner willingness to serve as 
supervisors and mentors). 
 48. See Nat Slavin, The Never-Ending Quest for Legal Alternatives, CORP. LEGAL 
TIMES, Feb. 2004, at 4 (explaining that the 1990s movement to hire independent companies 
to audit bills was followed by a move to use software and Internet tools to examine fees 
charged by outside counsel). 
 49. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 94. 
 50. “Sleep Debts” Accrue When Nightly Sleep Totals Six Hours or Fewer, Penn Study 
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Another survey inquiry asked respondents to register their opinions on 
work demands insidiously undermining attorneys’ ability to provide top 
quality legal services.  The questionnaire asked supervised attorneys 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Working 
long hours adversely affects my ability to think critically and creatively.”51  
The majority of firm respondents (62.8 percent) agreed with the statement.  
Only 19.2 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement.52
Other survey inquiries provided insights related to the personal and 
professional toll taken when attorneys work long hours with little or no 
balance between their personal and professional lives.  Table Two below 
sets forth the respondents’ level of agreement with statements related to 
stress and work-life balance. 
 
Table Two53
Agreement with Statements on Stress and Work-Life Balance 
 
as Reported by Firm Supervised Attorneys 
 
Statement                  Strongly Disagree    Disagree    Neither Agree/Disagree    Agree    Strongly Agree      
 
I feel stressed and                   3%                  22%                       22.5%                 37.9%            14.6% 
fatigued most of the 
time 
 
I must sacrifice 
fulfillment outside                 4.1%                16.5%                     16.5%              44.7%               18.2% 
of work in order 
to advance in my 
career 
 
I have a good balance              7%                 35.9%                    20.3%               31.9%                4.9% 
between my job 
and personal  life 
 
Find People Respond Poorly, While Feeling Only “Slightly” Tired, SCI. DAILY, Mar. 14, 
2003, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/03/030314071202.htm 
(referring to research with sleep-deprived individuals).  According to Dr. Hans P.A. Van 
Dongen, author of the sleep study, “[R]outine nightly sleep for fewer than six hours results 
in cognitive performance deficits, even if we feel we have adapted to it.”  Id. 
 51. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 97. 
 52. Id. at 27.  The following breaks down the respondents’ opinions on the Critical 
Thinking Statement: 18.4 percent strongly agreed, 44.4 percent agreed, 17.9 percent neither 
agreed nor disagreed, 16.5 percent disagreed, and 2.7 percent strongly disagreed.  In the 
1999-2000 Associate Survey, twenty-two percent of respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement, “Working long hours adversely affects my ability to think critically and 
creatively.”  Another forty-two percent “somewhat agreed” with the statement.  Only 
nineteen percent disagreed with the statement.  1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9, at 
274 n. 219 (discussing survey results and commentary related to the adverse effect on 
quality when attorneys consistently work long hours). 
 53. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 27. 
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As indicated in Table Two, the majority of law firm respondents 
indicated that they feel stressed and fatigued most of the time.  In addition, 
the majority of these respondents believe that they must sacrifice 
fulfillment outside of work in order to advance in their careers.  By 
comparison, smaller percentages of corporate and government respondents 
agreed with these statements.  Among the three practice sectors, law firm 
respondents reported the lowest percentage of agreement with the 
statement, “I have a good balance between my job and personal life.”54
TABLE THREE
 Long hours, stress, and work-life conflicts may contribute to job 
dissatisfaction and the desire to change employers.  Survey results outlined 
in Table Three reveal a relationship between the responses on the work-life 
balance inquiries and respondents’ desire to change jobs in the next two 
years. 
55
COMPARISON BETWEEN AGREEMENT QUESTIONS AND DESIRE TO CHANGE JOBS 
 
Positions on the Statements Reported as Means* 
 
 
I have a good balance between my job and my personal life. 
 
 All Government Corporate Firm 
Yes, I 
want to 
change 
employers 
in the 
next two 
years 
2.60 3.15 2.50 2.49 
No, I do 
not want 
to change 
employers 
in the 
next two 
years 
3.48 3.63 3.41 3.43 
Not sure 
if I want 
to change 
employers 
in the 
next two 
years 
3.07 3.79 3.36 2.85 
 
 54. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 97. 
 55. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 32. 
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I must sacrifice fulfillment outside of work in order to advance in my career. 
 
Yes, I 
want to 
change 
employers 
in the 
next two 
years 
3.81 3.27 3.79 3.93 
No, I do 
not want 
to change 
employers 
in the 
next two 
years 
2.87 2.34 2.93 3.07 
Not sure 
if I want 
to change 
employers 
in the 
next two 
years 
 
3.52 2.89 3.25 3.70 
 
* Higher numbers reflect greater agreement with the statement because means were 
calculated using the following scale: 
1=Strongly Disagree   2=Disagree   3=Neither agree/disagree   4=Agree   5=Strongly agree 
 
Based on the mean calculations set forth in Table Three, respondents not 
interested in changing jobs reported more agreement with the statement, “I 
have a good balance between my job and my personal life,” than 
respondents interested in changing jobs.  At the same time, the mean 
calculation for supervised attorneys interested in changing jobs showed 
more agreement with the statement, “I have to sacrifice fulfillment outside 
of work in order to advance in my career,” as compared to the mean for 
attorneys not interested in changing jobs.  These results are consistent with 
the commonly held belief that billable hours pressure and long work hours 
play a prominent role in driving attorneys to the exit door. 
“Numerous studies show that attorneys flee law firms because they 
believe that firms’ high billable hours requirements prevent them from 
balancing their work and their personal lives . . . .”56
 
 56. Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Part-Time Progress, Letting Lawyers Cut 
Back Can Save Money and Retain Talent—If Firms Do It Right, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2001, at 60 (noting that replacing a second or third-year associate costs between $200,000 
and $500,000). 
  Findings from the 
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2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study add to the body of empirical 
research indicating that working long hours adversely affects morale, job 
satisfaction, and retention.57  In the 2005 study, thirty-seven percent of firm 
respondents reported that they were interested in changing jobs in the next 
few years.58  When asked to identify the factor that was most influential in 
causing them to change jobs, the largest percentage of firm attorneys (26.4 
percent) checked “reduction of work hours.”59  The largest percentage of 
firm respondents who want to change jobs indicated that they were most 
interested in a corporate counsel job.  Evidently, these attorneys are not 
leaving the field of law, but are interested in escaping billable hours 
practice.60
PART III: “BOTTOM-UP” AND MARKET PRESSURE TO 
ADDRESS THE DAMAGING EFFECTS OF INCREASED 
BILLABLE HOURS EXPECTATIONS 
 
While practitioners may bemoan the emphasis on billable hours 
production and other objective measures of success in law firms, they often 
express pessimism about the possibility of changes to address work-life 
conflicts.61  In the 2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life study, various 
respondents criticized current approaches used in firms, while suggesting 
that lawyers are locked into the current system.  For example, in response 
to the open-ended question that asked respondents to describe 
improvements to “ameliorate work-life conflicts,” one respondent stated, 
“have everyone work less and earn less = fantasy.”62
 
 57. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, 28-33. 
  Another respondent 
 58. Id., app. B at 95. 
 59. For more detailed discussion of the survey results related to morale, satisfaction, and 
attrition, see id. at 95-96. 
 60. In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, thirty-nine percent of respondents reported that 
they were interested in changing employers in the next two years.  When asked to indicate 
the factor most influential in causing respondents to change jobs, the largest percentage 
(twenty-eight percent) checked “reduction in hours.”  The largest percentage of associates 
who wanted to change jobs (thirty-seven percent) indicated that they were most interested in 
a “corporate counsel position.”  1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9, at 283-87. 
 61. As stated by one commentator: 
  Hourly billing causes the lawyer’s life to be consumed by the need to log an 
increasing number of billable hours.  Law firms tend to become “hours factories” 
and the quality of the representation may decline as well as lawyer collegiality.  
Even though lawyers have recognized the harm caused to their profession and 
their client relationships, implementing change has been difficult. 
Arthur G. Green, Thinking Outside the Box, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 2004, at 17. 
 62. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. 
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suggested that firms “eliminate billable hours, which will never happen.”63
A few focus group participants discussed the possibility of change 
within law firms.  One partner participating in a New York focus group 
attributed recent changes to “bottom-up” pressure from associates who 
communicate with their feet and leave firms.  Change may occur if firms 
recognize what one Chicago partner described as a “powerful business 
rationale” for adopting policies that reduce “attrition of talented lawyers 
and the consequent reduction in the need to spend money to recruit and 
train lawyers. . . .”
 
64
To determine what policies and systems will address associate attrition, 
firm managers can use feedback and recommendations provided by 
Associate Retention or Quality of Life Committees.  In the 2005 NALP 
FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, 41.6 percent of supervised firm 
attorneys reported that they would “definitely use” a quality of life and/or 
retention committee.
 
65
In 2002, a demonstration of “bottom-up” pressure occurred at Clifford 
Chance, the world’s largest law firm.
  Such committees can serve as channel for 
associates to communicate their concerns and interests. 
66  Following the publication of the 
results of The American Lawyer’s 2002 associate survey, in which Clifford 
Chance rated last, the firm sought feedback from U.S. associates on its 
personnel committee.67  This group of six associates prepared a thirteen-
page memorandum to Clifford Chance’s partners in its New York office 
(“Associate Memorandum”).68  In referring to the “abysmal,” last place 
ranking in The American Lawyer’s October 2002 ‘Associates Survey,’ (‘the 
AmLaw Survey’), the Associate Memorandum stated, “our research has 
convinced us that the AmLaw Survey captures neither the breadth nor the 
depth of associate anger and frustration.”69
 
 63. Id. 
  Thereafter, the Associate 
 64. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, at 53. 
 65. In the same study, only 12.3 percent of supervised firm attorneys indicated that their 
firm currently had quality of life and/or retention committees.  2005 NALP FOUNDATION 
WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, app. B at 87. 
 66. Bob Sherwood, Clifford Chance Calls “War Council,” FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at 
1. 
 67. Robert Lennon, The Memo Heard Round the World, AM. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 19 
(discussing the “veritable uproar” and exaggerated media stories that followed news of the 
associates’ memorandum). 
 68. See id. (describing the genesis of the Associate Memorandum). 
 69. The full text of the Associate Memorandum was first reprinted in an article written 
by Bob Sherwood.  See Sherwood, supra note 66, at 1.  The memorandum itself explains 
that it incorporates comments made by associates at a Town Hall meeting (attended by 
approximately 140 associates), associates’ responses to a personnel committee survey, and 
discussions among personnel committee members and various firm associates. 
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Memorandum discussed problems that contribute to associate discontent.  
 After the Associate Memorandum was leaked to the press, the portion of 
the memorandum that triggered the most attention was the 2,420 billable 
hours requirement, the first “major problem” listed in the Associate 
Memorandum.70  After explaining that the “requirement constituted the 
greatest area of discontent by far,” the Associate Memorandum elaborated 
on specific consequences of the firm imposing such a requirement.71
Associates stated that the requirement is profoundly unrealistic, 
particularly in slow areas of the firm.  Moreover, Associates found the 
stress on billable hours dehumanizing and verging on an abdication of our 
professional responsibilities insofar as the requirement ignores pro bono 
work and encourages “padding” of hours, inefficient work, repetition of 
tasks, and other problems.  Associates expressed concerns that the 
requirement promotes misallocation of work to senior associates who 
“need” the hours when less expensive junior associates could do the work.  
Associates also stated that partners care only about associates’ billable 
hours.
  In 
referring to feedback obtained from firm associates, the Associate 
Memorandum stated: 
72
According to an article in The Financial Times that released the full text 
of the Associate  Memorandum, the claims that attorneys were encouraged 
to “pad” billable hours sparked client inquiries.
 
73  To address possible 
client concerns related to overcharging and inflated legal bills, the firm 
reportedly convened a “council of war” to “co-ordinate strategy and decide 
on a united message to give to clients.”74  The Financial Times article 
indicated that the firm “said it would review the billing hours 
requirement.”75
Following the unfavorable press related to the billing requirement and 
other associate complaints, Clifford Chance took steps to address associate 
concerns.
 
76
 
 70. A copy of the full text is available at http://www.lawcost.com/clifchancememo.htm.  
According to the Associate Memorandum, the requirements consisted of 2,200 hours of 
“hard billable” work and 220 hours of “soft billable” time.  After the memorandum was 
leaked, a firm representative confirmed that the firm set a 2,200 hour “target,” while 
encouraging associates to spend time outside client billables.  Lennon, supra note 67 at 19. 
  Press reports suggested that these changes contributed to 
Clifford Chance scoring the biggest percentage increase among firms rated 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Sherwood, supra note 66, at 1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Amy Vincent, On the Move, AM. LAW., Oct. 2003, at 103 (reviewing results and 
significant changes of firms rated in the 2003 AM LAW annual mid-level associate survey). 
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in The American Lawyer’s 2003 Associate Survey.77  The American 
Lawyer indicated that one Clifford Chance associate believed that “the firm 
has finally convinced associates that it takes their concerns seriously,” and 
another respondent hailed “the revocation of the 2,420-hour billables 
requirement.”78
Reflecting on the Clifford Chance saga illustrates an interesting interplay 
of different forces and dynamics involved in large firm practice.  First, the 
story started with The American Lawyer survey. Such surveys provide a 
vehicle for disgruntled associates to grade, laud, lampoon, and criticize 
their firms.  Firms, particularly those seeking to be included in The 
American Lawyer listing of the “top 20 firms” in the legal profession, may 
take steps to improve their ratings.
 
79
The efficacy of “bottom up” pressure largely depends on firm size, 
position, composition, economics, and culture.  In some firms, partners 
who view associates as fungible may discount the need to respond to 
associate complaints and concerns about billable-hours requirements and 
firm practices. 
  Second, media reports may affect 
firm reputation, influence client perceptions, and trigger changes in firm 
policies and practices.  In retrospect, “bottom-up” pressure from Clifford 
Chance associates, coupled with partner desire to improve survey ratings 
and the need to avoid client defections, may have led to the firm’s decision 
to revoke the 2,420-hour billing target. 
Even recalcitrant partners who resist changes sought by associates may 
take a different stance when forced to deal with market pressure.  
Specifically, partners may be persuaded to make changes if failure to do so 
adversely affects their ability to retain and attract clients.  This could occur 
if consumers considered the prospective firms’ attrition rates and billable 
hours expectations. 
General counsel for corporations, as buyers of legal services, are the best 
prepared client representatives to evaluate the firms that court their 
business.80
 
 77. Id. (reporting that Clifford Chance’s score rose from 2.74 in 2002 to 3.398 in 2003, 
a twenty-four percent increase in the firm’s overall rating). 
  Over the last two decades, general counsel for corporations 
 78. Id. 
 79. In 2003, The American Lawyer introduced a list of the “best law firms in the land.”  
Aric Press, The A-List, AM. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 84.  This list is based on a “carefully 
weighted ranking” derived from surveys of the AmLaw 200, the highest-grossing U.S. 
headquartered firms.  The ranking is based on the following standards: revenue per lawyer, 
pro bono work, associate satisfaction, and diversity.  Id. at 84-85.   
 80. See Brad Blickstein, “Mr. Inside . . . Mr. Outside”; Getting the Right Message to 
General Counsel, N.J. LAW.: THE WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Dec. 6, 2004, at 2487 (referring to the 
“increasing sophistication of general counsel as buyers of legal services”). 
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have used different approaches in selecting outside counsel.  Faced with 
intense pressure to reduce amounts expended for outside counsel, many of 
these approaches involved cost-cutting measures, such as using 
independent legal auditors, task-based billing, and research outsourcing.81  
While the results of these efforts may be mixed, general counsel continue 
to proactively seek ideas to minimize the costs of outside counsel while 
maintaining and enhancing the quality of legal representation.82  Surveys of 
general counsel reveal that their most pressing concern is controlling the 
costs of outside counsel.83
Corporate counsel are increasingly asking law firms to lower their bills
 
84 
and to use alternative fee arrangements.85  In experimenting with 
alternative fee arrangements, some general counsel recognize that the 
nature of billable hours practice may drive up the costs of legal services 
because the billable hours fee structure rewards inefficiency.86  As 
explained by a law firm consultant, “Rates don’t drive costs, [inefficient] 
staffing does.”87
Beyond the inefficiency associated with billing hours to maximize 
income, increasing billable-hours requirements within firms also impacts 
the costs of legal services.  As discussed in Part II, billable-hours pressure 
is driving many attorneys out of private practice.  In addition to tangible 
attrition costs, attrition also can adversely impact the firm clients who are 
served by departed attorneys.  Unless the outside law firm absorbs costs of 
“bringing the new attorney up to speed,” attrition can increase the cost of 
 
 
 81. For a review of the relative success of popular approaches used by general counsel 
in the 1990s, see Krysten Crawford, When Good Ideas Go Bad; In the 1990s, A Host of 
Trendy New Ideas Were Supposed to Change the Practice of Law as We Knew It, But Did 
they Actually Work?  LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at 21. 
 82. Irving B. Levinson, 101 Ways to Control Outside Legal Costs; Part I, Do You 
Really Need to Hire Outside Counsel?  Read This First, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1995, at 
11. 
 83. See Cutting Costs, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at 6 (reporting that for the third year 
in a row a American Corporate Counsel survey of in-house counsel indicated that their 
“most pressing concern is trying to reduce outside legal spending”). 
 84. Tom McCann, Corporate Counsel Urge Law Firms to Use Business Sense, CHI. 
LAW., May 2003, at 36. 
 85. Thomas L. Sager, All Corporate Lawyers Should Embrace Alternative Billing, 
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1997, at 13 (discussing DuPont’s use of alternative fee 
arrangements). 
 86. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Carr & Mark D. Wolf, IN-HOUSE SUPPLEMENT, Service Means 
More than Just Billable Hours, TEX. LAW, Feb. 3, 2003, at 13 (two in-house counsel 
promoting a new fee-structuring model in which outside counsel share risks and rewards). 
 87. Crawford, supra note 81, at 21 (quoting Peter Zeughauser, a Newport Beach, 
California consultant). 
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attorneys who bill on an hourly basis.88  Attrition may also adversely affect 
institutional knowledge and personal relationships.89  Understanding the 
costs of turnover, some general counsel are “considering attrition” and 
quality-of-life issues that affect attrition “in deciding which firms to 
retain.”90  General counsel factoring attrition into their selection of firms 
may spur firms to take additional steps to reduce attrition.  As suggested 
above, setting a reasonable billing target or requirement should improve the 
retention of many attorneys who indicate that they are changing jobs for a 
reduction in hours.91
Given the connection between attrition and billable hours pressure, 
general counsel should seek information on firms’ billable hours 
requirements and factor that information into their decision to hire 
particular firms.  General counsel who focus on the risks and costs 
associated with high billable hours requirements will realize that such 
information does not merely relate to firms’ internal operations, but rather 
to the cost and quality of legal services.
 
92
In retaining outside counsel, general counsel already weigh a variety of 
factors.
  Those general counsel who 
consider billable hours requirements when hiring outside firms recognize 
that high billable hours requirements create incentives to “overwork” files.  
They also appreciate that attorneys’ ability to think critically and creatively 
may be adversely affected by consistently working long hours. 
93
 
 88. See Peter D. Zeughauser, The Beauty Contest: Responding to the RFP, N.Y.L.J., 
Mar. 14, 1991, at 45 (recommending that law firms address corporate concerns about 
turnover by undertaking to “absorb the cost of bringing new lawyer up to speed”). 
  As demonstrated by the leadership role that general counsel have 
 89. Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Letting Lawyers Cut Back Can Save 
Money and Retain TalentBIf Firm Do It Right, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at 60. 
 90. See Lorelie S. Masters, What Women (Lawyers) Want—And Need, More Than 200 
Attorneys Gather in D.C. for NAWL Conference on Career Development, Law Firm 
Initiatives, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 18. (citing reports from Professor Joan Williams, 
Co-Chair of the Attorney Retention Project at American University’s Washington College 
of Law, and in-house attorneys Carole Jordan of Fannie Mae and Patricia Merrill of GE 
Asset Management). 
 91. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Tamara Loomis, Partner Status is a Billing Issue, NAT’L L.J., 2005, at 8.  
Beyond scrutinizing bills after legal work is already performed, some general counsel have 
sought information on firm structures and systems.  For example, with the recent increase in 
the number of non-equity partners in firms, the legal department at E.I. du Pont De Nemours 
& Co. has asked firms to reveal the status of their partners when the firms ask for fee 
increases.  Id. 
 93. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, Top of Mind, Second Annual Survey of In-House 
Counsel, http://www.klng.com/TOM_brochure_2004/media/topofmind_11.pdf (last visited 
July 24, 2005).  According to a study of senior in-house counsel at FORTUNE 500 and 
1000 businesses, eighty-nine percent ranked “effective communication” as a top factor when 
choosing outside counsel.  Id. 
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played in considering the diversity of the firms they retain, general counsel 
can positively influence firms who compete in “beauty contests” for 
corporate legal work.94
CONCLUSION 
  By seeking information on firms’ attrition rates 
and billable hours requirements, general counsel may trigger firms to 
rethink the current course of affairs. 
The voices of study participants put a personal face on the costs and 
consequences of billable hour pressure.  Firm leaders who understand the 
personal and professional toll of increasing billable hour requirements 
should fashion alternative work and compensation structures.  Even firm 
principals reticent to change may respond to “bottom-up” and market 
pressure once they recognize the business case for allowing alternative 
approaches, such as reduced-hours arrangements for attorneys.95
Discriminating general counsel who seek information on firms’ attrition 
rates and billable hour requirements can play an important role in causing 
firms to withdraw from the billable hour derby.  As suggested by two in-
house attorneys who urged firms to be “customer-focused,” “in-house 
counsel will continue to insist on paying for value and efficiency and such 
insistence will ultimately lead to a changed law firm economic model.”
 
96
Rather than waiting for general counsel to inquire about attrition rates 
and billable hours requirements, law firms leaders could impress general 
counsel and other consumers of legal services by taking steps to address 
various deleterious effects of billable hours practice.  For example, firms 
could lower onerous billable hours requirements and discontinue linking 
 
 
 94. See Rick Palmore, A Call to Action-Diversity in the Legal Profession, Association of 
Corporate Counsel (Oct. 2004), at http://www.acca.com/public/accapolicy/diversity.pdf.  A 
Call to Action, authored by Rick Palmore, the Chief Legal Office of Sara Lee, and signed by 
numerous general counsel across the country, stated that firms could “positively distinguish 
themselves through their diversity efforts.”  The signatories also stated that we “intend to 
end or limit our relationship with firms whose performance consistently evidence a lack of 
meaningful interest in being diverse.”  Id.; see also Leigh Jones, GCS Call For Greater 
Diversity Among Top-Tier Firms, THE RECORDER, Mar. 31, 2005, at 3 (explaining that A 
Call to Action, signed by hundreds of general counsel, is a revised version of a 1999 
proclamation calling for more diversity in law firms).  For a description of general counsel 
efforts to promote and track firm diversity, see Nathan Koppel, The 27 Winners of the Oil 
Giant’s Beauty Contest Have One Thing in Common: The Firms Can Show—Through 
Hiring and Billable Hours-How Serious They are about Diversity, CORP. COUNS., Aug. 
2004, at 106. 
 95. 2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study, supra note 10, at 50-51.  For an excellent 
commentary on the business justification for allowing attorneys to work less and make less, 
see Joan C. Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, SOLVING THE PART-TIME PUZZLE: THE 
LAW FIRM’S GUIDE TO BALANCED HOURS 2005 62. 
 96. Carr & Wolf, supra note 86, at 13. 
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bonuses to billable hours production.97  By adopting the Law Firm Billing 
Policy and “best practices” described in the ABA Billable Hours 
Commission Report, law firms can distinguish themselves when seeking 
business from new clients and fortifying relationships with existing 
clients.98
 
  In the long run, the desire to attract and retain clients may bring 
billable hour requirements back to a reasonable level, promising to improve 
the quality of work for client and quality of life for firm lawyers. 
 
 97. According to the A.B.A. Billable Hours Commission Report, a compensation 
“system that ties compensation—whether salary or bonus—directly to billable hours with no 
flexibility and no reflection . . . is a ‘worst practice.’” A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. 
 98. Id. at 46-51.  To discourage associates from “simply compiling more hours for more 
money,” the A.B.A. Billable Hours Commission recommends that firms “place a ceiling on 
the number of hours, over which no additional compensation in salary or bonus will be paid 
regardless of how high the hours.”  Id. at 47. 
